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This paper argues for an explicit materialist ontology to study social movements and popular 
struggles that oppose and confront the capitalist social order. Taking into consideration that 
differences between theories or theoretical systems should be discussed at the ontological 
dimension, not merely at the epistemological, empirical or logic-formal, we address the 
differences between the conventional set of Social Movement Theories, the post-Marxist 
approach, and an alternative approach that dialogues with those engaged in contemporary 
struggles, through the ontology of social being formulated by György Lukács. These 
constitute the first part of this paper, which aims to present our ontological, theoretical and 
methodological positions. In the second part, we offer some theoretical reflection on the 
themes provided by the activists in their actions and debates, in dialogue with propositions 
from intellectuals who engaged with social movements and/or oriented their work to oppose 
the system of capital. 
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DA PRÁTICA À TEORIA: REFLEXÕES SOBRE A ORGANIZAÇÃO DE 
MOVIMENTOS SOCIAIS E LUTAS POPULARES 
 
Este artigo argumenta por uma ontologia materialista explícita para estudar movimentos 
sociais e lutas populares que se opõe e confrontam a ordem social do capital. Levando em 
consideração que as diferenças entre teorias ou sistemas teóricos devem ser discutidas na 
dimensão ontológica, não meramente na epistemológica, empírica ou lógico-formal, 
abordamos as diferenças entre o conjunto convencional de Teorias Sobre Movimentos 
Sociais, a abordagem Pós-Marxista, e uma abordagem alternativa que dialoga com aqueles 
engajados em lutas contemporâneas, através da ontologia do ser social formulada por György 
Lukács. Estas formam a primeira parte do texto, que visa apresentar nossas posições 
ontológicas, teóricas e metodológicas. Na segunda parte, oferecemos algumas reflexões 
teóricas sobre temas emergentes nas ações e debates de ativistas, em diálogo com proposições 
de intelectuais que se engajaram com movimentos sociais e/ou orientaram seu trabalho para se 
opor ao sistema do capital. 
Palavras-chave: Movimentos Sociais. Ontologia. Lutas Populares. Resistência 
 
DESDE LA PRÁCTICA HACÍA LA TEORÍA: REFLEXIONES SOBRE LA 
ORGANIZACIÓN DE MOVIMIENTOS SOCIALES Y LUCHAS POPULARES 
 
Este artículo argumenta por una ontología materialista explícita para estudiar movimientos 
sociales y luchas populares que se oponen y confrontan el orden social del capital. Tomando 
en consideración que las diferencias entre teorías o sistemas teóricos deben ser discutidas en 
la dimensión ontológica, abordamos las diferencias entre el conjunto convencional de Teorías 
Sobre Movimientos Sociales, el abordaje Post-Marxista y un abordaje alternativo que dialoga 
con aquellos involucrados en luchas contemporáneas, por medio de la ontología del ser social 
formulada por György Lukács. Estas constituyen la primera parte del texto, que visa presentar 
nuestras posiciones ontológicas, teóricas y metodológicas. En la segunda parte, ofrecemos 
algunas reflexiones teóricas sobre temas que nos fueron indicados por los activistas en sus 
acciones y debates, en diálogo con proposiciones de intelectuales que se involucraran con 
movimientos sociales y/o desarrollaran su trabajo en oposición al sistema del capital. 
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Palabras clave: Movimientos Sociales. Ontología. Luchas Populares. Resistencia. 
 
 
The study of social movements (SMs) in the field of Organization Studies (OS) has 
usually followed the conventional set of Social Movement Theories (SMTs) and, more 
recently, a post-Marxist approach. Despite their differences, these perspectives share key 
aspects: they conceal normative standpoints and take for granted concrete determinations of 
capitalists social relations. However, an alternative approach to analyse SMs, involving 
dialogue with those engaged in contemporary struggles and the adoption of a materialist 
ontology, has been gaining space. Within a Marxist perspective, it explores the inspiration 
that SMs can offer to our modes of theorizing, teaching and researching (COX, 2014). 
Sharing this assumption, in this paper we explore the implications of adopting an  explicit 
materialist ontology to study SMs that oppose and confront the capitalist social order. 
Taking into consideration that differences between theories or theoretical systems 
should be discussed at the ontological dimension, not merely at the epistemological, empirical 
or logic-formal ones, we address the differences between these perspectives through the 
ontology of social being formulated by György Lukács
4
 in his later work. For him, human 
practice is finalistic, it is the ideal positing of an end and its consequence is objectification. To 
use Lukács’ (1978a, p. 43) term: it is teleological. Therefore, it presupposes the knowledge of 
real objects, relations, structures, etc., in a connection between subjectivity and objectivity 
subordinated to the priority of practice, which has a “guiding and controlling function for 
knowledge”. Lukács’ formulation on the ontology of social being (presented in the first 
section) provides support for the critique of the first two perspectives mentioned above 
(presented in the second and third sections, respectively). It also allows us to defend, in the 
fourth section, the relevance of the dual rhythm expressed in the movement from practice to 
theory and the movement from theory to practice, including facts that emerge from the 
ground, such as creativity in forms of struggle; and listening to the voices from below and to 
their theoretical/philosophical choices (DUNAYEVSKAYA, 1989).  
                                                             
4 Lukács final work on ontology was written in the years 1964-1970. In the German and in its Brazilian 
translation, the book has been separated in two volumes, comprising around 1.500 pages. Just three chapters out 
of ten have been translated into English, each one in one book. The first focuses on Hegel, the second on Marx, 
and the third on labour. Besides this fragmentary presentation, the translations have various problems. Therefore, 
we will usually refer to the Brazilian editions of Lukács’ ontology. 
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Another source of inspiration for the reflection we make in this paper is our own 
research related to social movements and popular struggles, as well as in studies performed by 
colleagues and students of our research group. These researches have included, among others, 
anti-extractivist struggles; strikes, occupations and popular fronts in defence of public 
education and public transport; movements for the right of living and inhabiting. 
All these processes offered inspiration for our reflections on key themes for the 
activists in their actions and debates. We also include a dialogue with propositions from 
intellectuals who engaged with SMs and/or oriented their work to oppose the system of 
capital. The aim is to provide an understanding that the political praxis is always, as Harvey 
(2000, p. 55) says, “embedded in ways of life and structures of feeling particular to places and 
communities”. It is also an attempt to show how the primacy of practice relates to theory, 
while remembering that the former does not remove a certain limited autonomy from the 
latter (SÁNCHEZ VÁSQUEZ, 1977). 
The aim of this paper is not to formalize an all-encompassing theory, which would 
repeat the reductionist perspectives that we criticize. Instead, we argue that the adoption of a 
materialist ontology to study social struggles indicates that we should take into consideration 
the practical/theoretical agenda embedded in each specific movement. It can contribute to 
how we approach a specific organizational phenomenon, thus re-establishing the mutual 
influence between Organization Studies (OS) Social Movements Studies (SMS) that, as we 
will show, marked the early developments of SMTs, but now in a very different direction. 
Before starting the first part, let us explain the reasons why we have chosen the word 
‘struggle’ instead of ‘resistance’. This choice was inspired on the distinction made by Scott 
(1985, p. 32) between two styles of resistance: the first are “quiet piecemeal process” and 
“dramatic public confrontations”; the second are “everyday resistance” and “open defiance”. 
In our reading, these differences indicate more than mere styles, they indicate different 
strategies: while the first refers to open social conflicts performed by collectives, and 
demands organization; the second indicates “low-profile forms of resistance that dare not 
speak in their own names” (SCOTT, 1990, p. 19) and, usually, are performed by individuals. 
These differences are clear and politically relevant and deserve to be named accordingly. 
Therefore, we have opted to refer to the first “style of resistance” as struggle, and to adopt the 
word resistance to refer to hidden and/or individual practices of defiance. 
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1 LUKÁCS’ ONTOLOGY OF THE SOCIAL BEING 
 
The ontological writings of György Lukács
5
 provide “a crucial way to find a concrete 
universal to which our theoretical and ethical categories can find reference […] without any 
of the dangers of moral relativism” (THOMPSON, 2011, p. 230). Vaisman and Fortes (2014, 
p. 134-135) consider that this work makes “a clear statement on the ontological basis of 
Marx’s reflections”, while clashing “with the orthodox understanding of Marx that prevailed 
throughout the 20th Century” obscured by the dogmas that have plagued “almost all the 
currents of Marxism since the death of Lenin” and, at the same time, privileging “the question 
of the emancipation of man”. It is the elaboration of an ontology of society based on Marx’s 
“path-breaking originality”. Referring to Marx’s writings, Lukács (1978a, p. 5) affirms that 
“for the first time in the history of philosophy the categories of economics appear as those of 
the production and reproduction of human life, and hence make it possible to depict the social 
existence ontologically on a materialist basis”. 
Lukács explains the meaning, in Marx’s ouvre, of the priority of the economic (a very 




If we ascribe one category ontological priority over the others, we simply 
mean that one of them can exist without the other, without the opposite being 
the case. This holds for the central thesis of all materialism, that being has 
ontological priority over consciousness. What this means ontologically is 
simply that there can be being without consciousness, while all consciousness 
must have something existent as its presupposition or basis.  This does not 
                                                             
5 Oldrini (2013) locates the ontological turn in the philosophical perspective of Lukács in the 1930’, when he had 
access to the early writings of Marx and realizes the way Marx reconstructs ontologically the concept of 
‘objective being’ that Hegel had lost in his speculative philosophy. However, the word ‘ontology’ did not come 
immediately, because of Lukács’ refusal of Heidegger’s connotation. It was only when he entered in contact with 
Ernst Bloch’s (1986) “ontology of the not-yet-being” (noch-nich-seins), published for the first time in 1961, and 
with Nicolai Hartmann’s (1975) “Ontology”, that he assumed the possibility of developing a Marxist and 
materialist ontology. 
6 After Marx’s and Engels’ death, in 1883 and 1895 respectively, historical materialism has gone through distinct 
and conflictive paths, starting by the conceptions of economic determinism and evolutionary socialism as in 
Eduard Bernstein and Karl Kautsky. These were the intellectuals who most influenced the Second International, 
an organization of socialist and labour parties which had its first meeting in 1889. For Oldrini (1999), the lack of 
an elaborated philosophical system in Marx and Engels writings created a situation in which their followers 
became dislocated and vulnerable, with no doctrinal system to oppose their adversaries. Instead of developing 
Marxism in Marx’s dialectics direction, they fell into “an incoherent eclecticism, according to which it was 
necessary to complete, from the outside, Marx’s economic doctrines”. In the philosophical dimension, Second 
International Marxism incurred in economistic limitations; it became a unilineal doctrine, in which “economy 
determine rigidly all of the other dimensions of reality”. In the political dimension, it resulted in a fatalist 
perception of capitalism and a natural evolution towards socialism. “From the Marxian law of the inevitable 
growing of capitalism contradictions, it is immediately deduced the consequence that, when contradictions are 
mature and explode, capitalism defeat occur by itself” (OLDRINI, 1999, p. 69). 
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involve any kind of value hierarchy between being and consciousness. 
(LUKÁCS, 1978a, p. 31) 
 
The ontological priority of being over consciousness goes pari passu with the priority 
of the economic over any other social complex: language, the law, the political, the 
ideological, etc. This does not mean that the former precedes or determines the latter in a 
mechanistic way; it means that without the former (economic relations of production and 
reproduction of life), the latter cannot even exist. 
We have already mentioned that human practice is teleological. Labour is central in 
this formulation because the creation of use-values is a condition of human existence that is 
independent of all forms of society, for the simple fact that no human activity would be 
possible if human beings could not reproduce their own life. Labour is also central because, 
through it, “a teleological positing is realized within the material being, as the rise of a new 
objectivity” (LUKÁCS, 1978b, p. 3). Labour, then, is the starting point to understand the 
social being in ontological terms, because all other categories (language, cooperation, division 
of labour, consciousness, etc.) presuppose a social character. Labour – “the original 
phenomenon”, “the model for all social practice”, the exclusively human activity that makes 
“teleological positing” real – can be used to illuminate other kinds of social positing 
(LUKÁCS, 1978b, p. 46) because the teleology entailed in labour is what distinguishes this 
specific human practice from the reproduction of other forms of being (organic and 
inorganic).  
Teleological positing, understood as an intentional activity, expresses and operates 
under a set of propositions about the causal properties of things in the world, i.e. knowledge. 
In other words: “[…] any practice, even the most direct and everyday, can be seen to have this 
connection in relation to understanding, consciousness, etc., because it is always a teleological 
act, in which the projection of goals precedes their realisation, both actually and 
chronologically” (LUKÁCS, 1978a, p. 43). However, in the course of human development, 
the knowledge acquired through practice has followed two distinct interconnected paths: on 
the one hand, when correctly generalized, knowledge that emerges from immediate practice is 
integrated into the human conception of the world; on the other, this knowledge remains 
confined to direct usability in immediate practice (DUAYER; MEDEIROS, 2005).  
Lukács (2012, p. 58) criticizes neopositivism for its “proclamation of the superiority of 
the principle of manipulation over any attempt to understand reality as reality”. It is the 
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transformation of the second trend mentioned above (knowledge that remains confined to 
direct usability in immediate practice) into a general doctrine of science, making the “entire 
system of knowledge” an “instrument of the general manipulability of all relevant facts” that 
naturalizes the existing order and, at the same time, denies any possibility of transcending it 
while refusing substantive notions about the world and the relations that bring it to exist such 
as it is. 
This very brief introduction to Lukács’ ontology helps us to present the notion of 
ontological critique: a criticism that not only demonstrates the falseness or incompleteness of 
a determined belief, dissolving its apparent naturalness, but also acknowledges its function in 
the social practice. 
It also allows us to present the specificities of political praxis as a teleological positing 
that aims to modify the existing social order. Before developing this idea, we should clarify 
the meaning of praxis. What differentiates it from mere activity and defines it as a properly 
human activity is that the actions taken to transform an object start with the ideal result or end 
and conclude with the real result. There is, hence, the interference of consciousness. If praxis 
is human activity and the means for the creation of a new reality, it is possible to speak of 
different levels of praxis in accordance with the presence of the active subject’s consciousness 
regarding the transformative process. Based on this argument, Sánchez Vásquez (1977) 
distinguishes between creative and bureaucratized praxis. The former is unpredictable and 
demands elevated consciousness, the latter only covers pre-existing forms with new clothes, 
the content is sacrificed to the form, the real to the ideal, the concrete particular to the abstract 
universal. Lefebvre (2014) makes a similar distinction: repetitive and creative praxis. 
We can now address the specificity of political praxis: it always has an ideological 
substance. Lukács (2013, p. 465) defines ideology as a form of “ideal elaboration of reality 
that makes human praxis conscious and capable of acting”. Its “immediate origin is in the 
social here and now (hic et nunc) of the human beings who act socially and in society”: 
“ideology is the means for the social struggle” (LUKÁCS, 2013, p. 465). Therefore, it is only 
possible to apprehend an ideology and its content by considering its social function in 
concrete antagonistic circumstances, not from the analysis of its gnoseological character of 
true or false consciousness.  
Lukács (2013, p. 506) offers two criteria for analysing political praxis as teleology: 
effectiveness and duration. The first corresponds to the immediate dimension of politico-
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ideological practice, “a real conflict caused by factors that are, in the final analysis, economic, 
and can be confronted and overcome by political means”; the second is an effect of the 
political activities that “set in motion the processual nexus of the fabric of society leading to a 
chain of consequences that serve to maintain society in its current form” or, alternatively, that 
“act by transforming the sociability and giving a new course of direction” (VAISMAN; 
FORTES, 2014, p. 140). 
Inspired by Lukács’ propositions, our aim in the following section is to engage 
critically with SMTs, considering their connections with the field of OS. 
 
2 THE DOMINANT APPROACH IN THE STUDY OF SOCIAL MOVEMENTS: A 
CRITIQUE 
 
According to Cox and Fominaya (2013, p. 7-8), “anyone researching SMs will find 
themselves hearing or reading a near-identical account, often repeated word-for-word, of how 
the discipline came to be”. They continue: “it is a tale of the bad old days of collective 
behaviour theory, followed by the rise of resource mobilization theory, the addition of 
political opportunity structure, the encounter with (‘European’) ‘new social movement’ theory 
(NSMT) and the arrival of framing theory”. This ‘origin myth’, as the authors name this 
account, represents the “uncritical translation of US exceptionalism (the historical weakness 
of the political left and labour movements)”. The authors provide, then, an alternative 
narrative introducing references from the European SMs practices and theories, concluding 
that “perhaps it is time to break free of the idea that it is necessary to use SMTs, as currently 
defined, to study movements” (COX; FOMINAYA, 2013, p. 25). 
A critical account of the origins of SMTs also demonstrates it has been strongly 
influenced by approaches constructed to analyse business organizations; and that theories 
identified with North American SMTs orthodoxies share common ground with Organization 
Studies (OS) orthodoxies. According to McAdam and Scott (2005), in the mid-1960s, a group 
of young scholars (including GAMSON, 1968; TILLY and RULE, 1965; ZALD and ASH, 
1966) began to formulate arguments to account for social unrest, converting the earlier focus 
on collective behaviour to one on collective action, SMs, and social movement organizations 
(SMOs). Most of this work employed an institutional perspective and reframed the view of 
protests and demands for reform from one of reactive individual behaviour (SMELSER, 
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1962) to one involving instrumental action, mainly focusing on the political process and two 
mechanisms: resource mobilization (McCARTHY and ZALD, 1977) and political 
opportunities (TILLY, 1978). In the 1980s, the NSMT emerged in the European context to 
analyse movements that, in a society defined as post-industrial, organized around issues such 
as ethnicity, sexuality, environmentalism, pacifism and human rights. The main concerns 
were related to identity, culture, and meaning (TOURAINE, 1985; MELLUCI, 1989). 
The decades that followed witnessed theoretical developments that attempted to 
approximate these two branches, such as the influential work of Tarrow (1998). For him, SMs 
emerge and spread in response to political opportunities and, in the sequence of events, create 
new opportunities and possibilities for the conformation of new identities (MCADAM; 
TARROW; TILLY, 2001). Complementing that work, McAdam, McCarthy and Zald (1996) 
introduced the cognitive mechanisms-based approach, known as the “framing process”, to 
analyse the importance of socially constructed and shared ideas (ZALD, 1996). It is also 
important to mention the very influential structuralist model of analysis disseminates by Tilly 
(2008) in which SMs are defined by the combination of three elements: campaign; repertoire; 
and the display of worthiness, unity, numbers and commitment. In these approaches, it is easy 
to recognize the importance given to environmental factors and institutions to the organization 
and success of SMs.  
Perhaps the best-known critique of SMTs is related to its ‘structural bias’, i.e., the 
adaptation of SMs to structural constraints given by its social, economic or institutional 
environment, operationalized by the analyst using the main categories: political opportunities, 
mobilization of resources, and framing. Critical theoretical and epistemological discussions 
on these models usually emphasize the imposition of structure over agency and the 
impossibility of the conceptual models to address different dimensions in the objects under 
scrutiny. The main problem is the practice of constructing a theoretical model, which is used 
to analyse what is taken as a passive, obscured and undertheorized object. The same happens 
to the distinct social process in which it emerges.  
According to Duayer (2015), this scientific practice is characterized by a tautological 
movement in which the researcher comprehends social processes through his own system of 
beliefs, ideological coordinates and ontological schema, looking for regularities and 
behaviour patterns that fit his own presuppositions. The result “can only consist of empirical 
regularities between phenomena or stable functional relations between observable variables 
  
    REAd | Porto Alegre – Vol. 26 – N.º 1 – Janeiro / Abril 2020 – p. 18-48. 
27 27 
from the perspective given by theories” (DUAYER, 2015, p. 101). The implicit ontological 
presupposition is that the world consists of atomized phenomena that can be interpreted 
following a set of theoretical axioms. 
SMT also has an ideological character that can be easily identified if we consider the 
strong influence of OS, mainly in the North American context. One example is the 
development of the theory of resource mobilization born out of OS in dialogue with Olson’s 
(1965) rational choice approach. For Diani (2000, p. 5), this is an interesting case of how an 
analytical perspective (OS), when creatively applied to a new empirical domain (SMs) to 
highlight some specific processes, “becomes increasingly popular among practitioners whose 
main intellectual identification is with the specific empirical field rather than with the 
approach, and eventually is turned into a theory of the empirical object”.  
In a similar fashion, Misoczky, Flores and Silva (2008, p. 12) argue that a “theory 
abstracted from capitalist organizations within the North-American context in last century is 
being used to explain contemporary social movements, many of them anti-capitalist and in 
different contexts”. The authors go even further, showing the process of appropriation of 
SMTs by business-oriented scholars, using SMs practices to propose models and instruments 
of management, homogenizing SMs and business enterprises under the label of 
‘organizations’ (CLEMENS, 2005). This mutual influence explains the fact that a search in 
two of the main international journals in the field of OS – Organization and Organization 
Studies – using the term ‘social movements’ showed that the study of SMs not only takes 
business-oriented literature as the main references (see DUBUISSON-QUELLIER, 2013; 
HENSBY, SIBTHORPE and DRIVER, 2011), but also tends to analyse them by reproducing 
the logic applied to business organizations (see YAZIJI and DOH, 2013).  
The implications of this include the adoption of the reified definition of organization 
(present, for example, in the term Social Movement Organizations), which constitutes an 
obstacle to accepting the study of the organizational practices of movements as genuinely 
belonging to the field of OS; the adoption of analytical criteria such as success, performance, 
and influence; an emphasis on structural and environmental aspects; and a tendency to value 
the reproduction or creation of new orders. Another finding was an overwhelming 
predominance of articles based on institutional perspectives
7
.  
                                                             
7 Some examples are presented here. Bertels, Hoffman and DeJordy (2014) explore the nature of the work 
undertaken by institutional challengers in the US environmental movement, drawing on the tools of social 
network analysis. Haug (2013), building on the concept of partial organization, develops the concept of meeting 
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In addition, in agreement with Goodwin and Jasper (1999, p. 34), we may recognize 
the capitalist liberal social ideology as the background for the dominant approaches - much of 
the theorization was produced when analysing “movements pursuing political participation or 
rights, notably the labour and civil rights movements” in the USA. In turn, the NSMT 
approach originated mainly in Europe in the 1970s and 1980s with the rise of movements that 
brought to the political agenda issues such as ethnicity, ecology, gender, etc. A consequence 
is that the values and world vision behind these theoretical models prevent fruitful dialogues 
with movements that struggle to transcend social established orders and values. 
This leads us back to Lukács (2012, p. 58) and to his proposition that “the refusal of 
every ontology means, simultaneously, the proclamation of the superiority, as a principle, of 
manipulation over every attempt to comprehend reality as reality”. He argues that positivism 
achieved a “maximum conceptual perfection” that led to neopositivism, in which a specific 
“theory of knowledge becomes a regulatory technique of language, of transformation of 
semantic and mathematical signs, of translation of one language into another”. Taking these 
reflections into consideration, we argue that practical relevance cannot be a definitive 
criterion to judge the value of a body of knowledge or a theory. 
We introduce this discussion because of the popularity of Bevington and Dixon’s 
(2005) argument about SMTs’ irrelevance from the activists’ standpoint. They correctly 
describe a situation in which activists and those who were supposed to benefit from SMTs do 
not read and do not use it. “The reason for this”, they contend, “is that activists do not find 
such theory useful” (BEVINGTON; DIXON, 2005, p. 186). They then draw on Flacks (2004) 
to argue for the need of a movement-relevant theory, i.e., a theory that seeks “to draw out 
useful information from a variety of contexts and translate it into a form that is more readily 
applicable by movements to new situations – i.e. theory” (BEVINGTON; DIXON, 2005, p. 
189). Their concept of usefulness, as already mentioned, was borrowed from Flacks (2004), 
who proposes that studies should provide clues about how to accomplish frame alignment, the 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
arena – a hybrid of three forms of social orders (organization, institution and network). Bakker, Den Hond, King 
and Weber (2013, p. 573), introducing a special issue on SMs, civil society and corporations, suggest three 
research areas: “the blurring of the three empirical domains and corresponding opportunities for theoretical 
integration, the institutional and cultural embeddedness of strategic interaction between agents, and the 
consequences of contestation and collaboration”. Özen and Özen (2009, p. 547) consider that the integration of 
“neo-institutional and SMT for a better understanding of social institutional change offers a partial picture 
concerning the roles of the state and society in institutional wars”. Finally, Soule (2012), reviewing the nexus of 
organizational and SMT, and reflecting on the Occupy movement, suggests five lines for future researches: 
police response to threat as an organizational issue; the extent to which public protests may inspire less overt 
forms of action – what we would refer as resistance; the role of religion in anti-corporate protest; how 
organizational learning theories can help to understand diffusion and the dynamics of coalition formation. 
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value of informal networks and the importance of opportunity structures. In other words, a 
useful theory would show activists how to operationalize these concepts and categories. This 
is confirmed by the authors’ adoption of Perrow’s (1970, p. viii) statement in the Foreword of 
his classical Organization Analysis, as an epigraph: “One test of good theory is that it has 
practical implications. […] What a theory does is to show how to analyze an organization or 
an organizational problem, in a way to enable a rigorous selection of specific techniques”. 
This is precisely Lukács’ (2012, p. 58) critique of knowledge as “an instrument of 
general manipulability”, because it naturalizes the social order, thus enabling, for example, 
SMs to identify political opportunities in the structure and fit into them while, at the same 
time, denying the possibility of transcendence. Instead, it is necessary to produce a knowledge 
that explains the material fundaments of the existing order as a mediation to intervene and 
transform it. In other words: praxis. Relevance is not a matter of generalization and 
applicability, it relates to the necessary comprehension of the processual fabric of society in 
its relationship with the actual political action (LUKÁCS, 2013). 
This problem is in tandem with Goodwin’s (2012, p. 10) reference to “the strange 
disappearance of capitalism” in SMS, which “lacks not only any anti-capitalist spirit but 
usually any explicit normative standpoint; they seem more concerned with contributing to the 
specialized academic literature on movement dynamics than with pondering how movements 
might lead us to the good society” (GOODWIN, 2012, p. 8). 
The reasons for that are various and very much discussed in OS and social sciences in 
general. They are related to the emergence of post-modern and post-structuralist approaches – 
a phenomenon that reflects, in knowledge production, the emergence of neoliberalism and the 
end of the Socialist bloc. One consequence has been that SMS “largely abandon the path of 
tracing movement development back to the conflicts generated within the lifeworld by power, 
exploitation and ideology” (COX and NILSEN, 2007, p. 429). This consideration leads us to 
critically engage with Laclau and Mouffe’s post-Marxism in the following section.  
 
3 SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AS CHAINS OF EQUIVALENCE: A CRITIQUE 
 
Alone, and together with Chantal Mouffe, Ernesto Laclau has written many books and 
papers on political theory and social sciences. We decided to include the discussion of Laclau 
and Mouffe’s (2001) seminal book Hegemony and Socialist Strategy because the theoretical 
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propositions it contains have been widely applied in the analysis of SMs and organizations in 
general and particularly in OS
8
. In the next paragraphs, we briefly present Laclau and 
Mouffe’s arguments. 
Laclau and Mouffe’s central concern is operational; not ontological. In proposing a 
theoretical framework and a new strategy for the left, they clearly state in the Preface to the 
second edition of Hegemony that “the problem with ‘actually existing’ liberal democracies is 
not with their constitutive values crystallized in the principles of liberty and equality for all, 
but with the system of power which redefines and limits the operation of those values” 
(LACLAU; MOUFFE, 2001, p. xv). Published sixteen years after the first edition, the Preface 
incorporated the label ‘post-Marxist’, which the authors did not create, but accepted. 
The book’s main argument, in strategic and practical terms, is that “struggles against 
sexism, racism, sexual discrimination, and in defence of the environment need to be 
articulated with those of the workers in a new left-wing hegemonic project” (LACLAU; 
MOUFFE, 2001, p. vviii). The starting point is a critique of the reduction of any strategic and 
analytical perspective to class relations or class struggles, which is defined by them as class 
essentialism. This argument is based on an anti-dialectic reading of Marx that followed the 
trends inaugurated mainly by Kautsky (defined by Trotsky (1919) as the propagandist and 
vulgarizer of Marxism) and legitimized by the Second International. In Laclau and Mouffe’s 
writings, Marxism can be understood as being synonymous of a deterministic relation 
between base and superstructure (see footnote number 3).  
Laclau and Mouffe (2001, p. 69) centrally engage with the concept of hegemony, but 
in a radically reformulated version of Gramsci’s (2006) concept. They sever the material 
connection of both the hegemonic and subaltern groups to the social structures and instead 
privilege contingency and articulation. For them, the main condition for hegemony is that 
                                                             
8 Some examples of studies using Laclau and Mouffe’s schema to analyze social movements are presented below 
in a non-exhaustive list. Spicer and Böhm (2007, p. 1667), asking how to understand “multiple forms of 
resistance against the discourse of management”, addressed four resistance movements – unions, organizational 
misbehavior, civic movements and civic movement organizations, and discussed possible interconnections 
between those different forms of resistance. Contu, Palpacuer and Balas (2013, p. 381) identified a collective 
resistance of workers against the restructuring of two industrial plants in France. They focused on the alignments 
and alliances, and argued that “subject mobilization also comprises specific articulations that are important in 
establishing the resulting identities and interests at stake”. In another paper, Van Bommel and Spicer (2011, p. 
1717) analyzed the slow food movement through Laclau and Mouffe’s schema and the concept of ‘institutional 
field’, arguing that slow food “forged hegemonic links among a range of disparate actors”. Otto and Böhm 
(2006, p. 312), in turn, analyzed the Coordinadora Departamental en Defensa del Agua y de la Vida struggle for 
water in Cochabamba, Bolivia, and concluded that “the articulation of a variety of different demands was 
channeled into a common demand: water.”  
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“elements whose own nature does not predetermine them to enter into one type of 
arrangement rather than another, nevertheless coalesce, as a result of external or articulating 
practices” (LACLAU; MOUFFE, 2001, p. xii). To achieve hegemony is to articulate diverse 
discursive elements in opposition to an antagonist one. Therefore, there are no privileged 
ontological agents of struggle (CONTU, 2002); instead, social agents coalesce in a contingent 
manner through chains of equivalence. 
In fact, Gramsci (2006) widened Marx’s class perspective in such a way that the 
subaltern and the dominant remain the two main groups in any social struggle, but they are 
not only an expression of the division of labour between capitalists and workers, they are also 
involved in the intellectual struggle: a struggle over concepts, world views, ideologies and 
projects. This seminal contribution is criticized by Laclau and Mouffe (2001, p. 69). In their 
reading, “[…] a failure in the hegemony of the working class can only be followed by a 
reconstitution of bourgeois hegemony, so that in the end, political struggle is still a zero-sum 
game among classes. This is the inner essentialist core which continues to be present in 
Gramsci’s though, setting a limit to the deconstructive logic of hegemony”. 
For Laclau and Mouffe, the main condition for hegemony would be a dialectics 
between logics of difference and logics of equivalence. Let the authors explain the schema: 
Social actors occupy differential positions within the discourses that 
constitute the social fabric. In that sense, they are all, strictly speaking, 
particularities. On the other hand, there are social antagonisms creating 
internal frontiers within society. Vis-à-vis oppressive forces, for instance, a 
set of particularities establish relations of equivalence between themselves. It 
becomes necessary, however, to represent the totality of the chain, beyond 
the mere differential particularisms of the equivalential links. What are the 
means of representation? As we argue, only one particularity whose body is 
split, for without ceasing to be its own particularity, it transforms its body in 
the representation of a universality transcending it (that of the equivalential 
chain). This relation, by which a certain particularity assumes the 
representation of a universality entirely incommensurable with it, is what we 
call a hegemonic relation. (LACLAU; MOUFFE, 2001, p. xiii) 
 
Although very influential, this approach has also been heavily criticized. For the sake 
of space, we mention just two of these appraisals. For Dussel (2001, p. 200), it is not possible 
to find the “criteria which enable political and strategic action to exert hegemony which is not 
for mere hegemony, but in favour of the oppressed”. For Martín (2014, p. 122), “class 
struggle has a subjective and contingent moment; but this is not autonomous in respect to the 
blind and objective logic of capital where it occurs”. More than that: “the hypostasis of 
ontological contingency in any factual situation […] impedes the understanding of the forms 
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of domination historically determined in capitalism (tied to objective and reified dynamics of 
value)” (MARTÍN, 2014, p. 124).  
In contrast to the ontological priority of the economic, which according to Lukács 
(2012) defines a materialist ontology; Laclau and Mouffe’s (2001) approach is based on the 
priority of discourse and contingency. They do not provide analytical tools to comprehend the 
structural determinants of the real. Therefore, this approach is not capable of making a 
dialectical movement, instead, it starts in the superstructure and there it remains. The world 
that lies behind it is a relatively harmonious one in which, as liberal democratic theory 
defends, everyone would be able to articulate against anything; a process that conceals 
concrete differences and impedes any attempt at radical transcendence. In other words, it 
allows what Bonefeld (2012, p. 124) defines as a “reified consciousness”, in which it is 
enough to “declare that the enemy of my enemy is my friend” indifferent to the “ends and 
social contents that hold sway in things” (BONEFELD, 2012, p. 129). 
This implies a relativist position in which the emphasis on contingent articulations and 
antagonisms ensures the core contradiction from which social conflicts originate apparently 
disappear, together with the connections between social groups and movements and the 
material base of their existence. It opens the possibility of assuming a world without 
necessities, something Chasin (2000, p. 17) has called politicism: the naturalization of the 
economic and the overvaluation of the political. In such an approach, “the economy is 
considered a kind of amorphous wallpaper, a virtual platform full of possibilities to be defined 
by the political – a correlation of forces that constitute alliances”.  
By obscuring structural elements, class positions, and social necessities, this approach 
induces interpretations regarding social conflicts in which the activists, social struggles, 
organizational practices and distinct processes cannot be linked to any position in concrete 
material realities. This perspective interdicts attempts to address the multiple determinations 
of the real, let alone propose and inform any attempt to radically transform the world. It 
expresses an ontology in which social being has no essence, no history, in sum, is floating in a 
void, to use Bashkar’s words in a debate with Laclau (LACLAU; BASHKAR, 1998); an 
implicit antirealist premise, which places the truth in the propositions (discourses) about 
things, instead of placing it in the things themselves (NORRIS, 1996). 
The refusal to differentiate essence from appearance poses a serious risk for 
knowledge production, because it avoids questions about the causal relations that bring reality 
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into existence. Therefore, human beings are not capable of “grasping the precise nature of a 
complex phenomenon in relation to the general laws that condition it and from which it 
simultaneously appears to deviate” (LUKÁCS, 1978a, p. 106). Instead, they would only be 
capable of a bureaucratic, repetitive praxis, which remains prisoner of the contingent 
immediacy and incapable of transforming the oppressive reality. 
When used to study SMs, Laclau and Mouffe’s propositions lead scholars to reach 
generic and insufficient findings, which tend to emphasize operational aspects. This has an 
obvious consequence from the perspective of knowledge construction but may have an even 
more adverse effect if it induces strategies that neglect the material content and circumstances 
of social conflicts. 
Having presented our critiques in the sections above, we can now introduce our 
theoretical and methodological positions. 
 
4 THE DIALECTICAL MOVEMENT BETWEEN PRACTICE AND THEORY 
 
Barker, Cox, Krinsky and Weber (2013, p. 1-2) make the case for a Marxist revival, 
discussing “how the concept of ‘movement’ might be interwoven with other foundational 
concepts in Marxist theory”, such as class struggle, hegemony, revolution, generic-being, 
alienation and praxis. They also recognize that mainstream SMT “consistently avoids debate 
with Marxist perspectives, although they constitute by some margin the largest alternative 
body of research on popular movements”. Similarly, Nilsen and Cox (2013, p. 64) discuss 
what a Marxist SMT would look like. According to them, it would have to be geared towards 
“the open-ended analysis of movement-processes in specific places”, it would need to 
encompass everyday struggles “to make sense of the way in which activists can move from 
one towards the other through collective learning”. 
Engaging with these arguments and replacing predefined research agendas and/or 
prescriptive theories external to the activist’s experience and everyday organization (COX, 
2014), we value the inspiration SMs can offer. Avoiding the institutional-political 
reductionism, which led SMTs to “largely abandon the path of tracing movement 
development back to the conflicts generated within the lifeworld by power, exploitation and 
ideology” (COX; NILSEN, 2007, p. 429), as well as the relativism of post-Marxism, we 
follow the inspiration provided by Dunayevskaya’s (1982) reflections based on her own 
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activism during the so-called freedom movement that marked the intermediate decades of the 
last century in USA. She realized that blacks, women, workers and youth were not faceless 
masses to be led, but rather the producers, by their very actions, of a theory of human 
liberation that emanates from the dialectical movement from practice to theory and from 
theory to practice. 
An illustration comes from the uniqueness of the Women’s Liberation Movement 
(WLM) in challenging not only chauvinism under capitalism, but the left-wing movement 
itself. The long previous history of women that confronted exploitative working conditions 
and demanded rights (such as the right to vote), both in the North and in the Global South, 
finally became a movement expressing ideas whose time had come. In the 1960s, women 
speaking in many voices and in many places worked out their own vision 
(DUNAYEVSKAYA, 1989) and produced a body of knowledge that keeps informing many 
struggles since then. A wide set of heterogeneous theories could not come to exist without 
praxis, without the concrete struggles and the constant reflection, without the indispensable 
knowledge of the many forms of oppression that made the organization to confront them 
necessary and possible. 
This historical movement, which has been able to articulate a universal value 
(women’s liberation) out of situated struggle, is an illustration, not a model. Our argument is, 
in agreement with Cox (2017, p. 6), that “there is no safe place to stand within language or 
theory”. It is “in the real human practice that the actual meaning of particular words, 
organizations, and traditions in particular places become clear”. 
This statement reflects a “critical realist ontology”, which combines “the recognition 
of underlying realities with a critical approach – one that reaffirms the necessity of how things 
currently are, but acknowledges its constructed character and hence the possibility of 
challenging and changing structures” (COX; NILSEN, 2014, p. 17). In that same vein, 
Lukács’ ontology provides a complex set of propositions, which, for reasons of space, we are 
unable to fully explore in this paper. Therefore, our aim is to take his main ideas and 
categories and use them to think about how we can gain a clearer understanding of “the 
people who move and the things they move against”, in the words of Cox (2017, p. 3). 
Therefore, our work has connections with that of Cox and colleagues, and our specific 
contribution is to draw on an explicit materialist ontology, which is, so far, quite implicit in its 
developments.  
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We also include ourselves among the activists and/or academics who defend the need 
to articulate two dimensions of critical reflexive thought: theoretically elaborated knowledge; 
and knowledge that emerges from below and remains, most of the time, restrained to the 
praxis and spaces of struggle (RAUBER, 2004). Malo (2004) also defends the possibility of 
producing knowledge through research processes that articulate theory and praxis, that take 
the concrete reality as the starting point, that move from the simple to the complex, from the 
concrete to the abstract, that share the aim of creating a theoretical content that is relevant and 
meaningful because it is attached to the everyday life of activists and to the organizing 
processes. 
It should be clear, by now, that we understand knowledge as “the interaction between 
differently-situated, experientially-grounded and practice-oriented modes of knowing”, not 
arriving only from closed spaces or “from participation in an invited place, but rather through 
claimed or created spaces intended to enable discussion between different modes of knowing” 
(COX, 2014, p. 961).  Accordingly, theory is a tool used to figure out what is happening, why 
it is happening and what to do about it, “by going beyond the immediaticy and situatedness of 
a particular experience” (COX; NILSEN, 2014, p. 21). 
The engagement with the practical, sometimes tacit, knowledge that is articulated in 
the concrete movement demands a close relationship with activists and their organizational 
practices. There is a long tradition of qualitative research methods that respect the ethical and 
political purposes of movements. This is the case, for example, of participatory action 
research, a confluence of critical theory and social pedagogy (mainly popular education and 
the critical pedagogy of Paulo Freire, 2005), which aims to articulate research and practical 
interventions with knowledge, experience and the needs of local communities. As Fals Borda 
(2012, p. 213) puts it: “how to research reality to transform it through praxis”. Another key 
element is the process of co-research in which the participants are partners sharing values 
(KINCHELOE, MCLAREN and STEINBERG, 2011).  
Another example is militant workers’ self-inquiry, which originated in Marx’s 
questionnaire to be circulated among the French working class in 1880, renewed by dissident 
Italian Marxism in the 1960s and 1970s (PANZIERI, 1994). The workers’ inquiry is a kind of 
co-research – a form of research that tears down the division between the subject-researcher 
and object-researched (MALO, 2004). More recently, such approaches have been extended to 
militant research – the place where academia and activism meet in the search for new ways of 
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acting that lead to new ways of thinking (BOOKCHIN, BROWN, EBRAHIMIAN et al., 
2013). 
These approaches express an attitude that requires a willingness to think, to listen, to 
see, to feel, to taste the world from the perspective of the Other; it is conditioned by 
humbleness and solidarity, following Dussel’s (1974) ‘analectics’. Alcoff (2011, p. 67) 
defines analectics as “an epistemology for the new revolution”, because it puts “at the center 
not simply the objective conditions of global impoverishment and oppression, but the 
systematic disauthorization of the interpretive perspective of the oppressed”.  
In the next section, we present some topics that form the theoretical agenda that 
emerged from the struggles we have been engaging with and from an analysis that seeks to 
advance a way of thinking, theorizing and transforming concrete reality in a dialectical 
movement from practice to theory and from theory to practice. The topics are: 
spontaneity/organization, autonomy/organization, horizontality, and the occupation of public 
spaces. 
 





 Debord (1965, p. 3), writing about the Watts Riots, asked: “How do people make 
history under conditions designed to dissuade them from intervening in it?”. This critical 
question has been posed by many in relation to social upheavals that have taken almost 
everyone by surprise, upsetting structures and bringing new elements of social life that 
“become briefly visible in luminous transparency” (LEFEBVRE, 1969, p. 7). Some have 
looked for answers in the idea of a spontaneous coming together; others insist on the previous 
existence of ceaseless practices of grassroots organization. 
For Roesch (2012), as well as Fernández, Sevilla and Urbán (2012), spontaneity and 
organization exist in a constant dialectical relationship with one another. For these authors, 
there is no such thing as pure spontaneity: at some point, the accumulated indignation breaks 
to the surface, but it incorporates previous histories of resistance and seemingly fruitless 
struggles, small demonstrations of a few hundred people, years of patient organizing work, 
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small victories and big defeats, dreams and frustrations. The ceaseless organizing of many 
activities can only assume forms that are more definite when the struggle emerges on a higher 
level. Nonetheless, the organizing done in periods of calm is not only critical but also shapes 
the character of the mass struggle that emerges: “Out of a whole series of small battles, 
elements of leadership begin to form, different politics begin to emerge, and certain tactics, 
symbols, and themes begin to develop and resonate. Connections are formed, are sometimes 
lost, but then re-emerge as struggle begins to develop at a sharper level” (ROESCH, 2012, p. 
5).  
 For Lefebvre (1969, p. 69), writing immediately after the events of the French May 
1968, “there is, of course, no absolute spontaneity. […]  The explosion of spontaneity arises 
out of prior conditions”. The author offers further elaborations on the meaning of spontaneity: 
(a) it is triggered when lags accumulate, involving the range of distortions and disparities; (b) 
it is in the streets that spontaneity expresses itself, because this is an area of society not 
occupied by institutions; (c) spontaneity and the transformation of the streets into political 
arenas leads to the phenomenon and problem of violence; (d) deep-seated spontaneity is not 
only a reaction to disparities and accumulated lags, but are also a symptom of new 
contradictions. “Drawn in by the void, spontaneity begins to fill it.” However, “spontaneity 
needs an orientation. It requires a kind of thought which can understand it, which can guide it 
without shifting it” (LEFEBVRE, 1969, p. 51). 
Luxemburg’s (2004) theory of mass action (inspired by the 1905 Russian Revolution) 
is still helpful when considering the role of political leadership in expressing the significance 
of mass actions and to clarify their goals. For her, mass actions produce the conditions for the 
organizational work to begin, in a movement from spontaneity to conscious political 
organization. Writing about the struggle in Russia, she said: “[…] the apparently ‘chaotic 
strikes and the ‘disorganized’ revolutionary action after the January general strike are 
becoming the starting point of a feverish work of organization” (LUXEMBURG, 2004, p. 
186). It is a mistake to portray Rosa Luxemburg as an advocate of spontaneity against 
organization. In fact, she opposed the substitution of the working-class self-organization by 
bureaucratized vanguards but reflected on the dialectics between spontaneity and 
organization. It is in the spontaneous movement that the disorganized, the unconscious, the 
naïve, can become conscious of the class situation and organize collectively to become a 
political subject. 
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5.2 AUTONOMY/ORGANIZATION.  
 
 According to Bonefeld (2004, p. 5), the aim of autonomy is human emancipation and 
human emancipation can only be achieved by the self-organization of the exploited regardless 
of pre-existing forms, like the party or the union. He refers to “the autonomy of social self-
determination against forms of organization that derive their rational from capitalist society 
and are thus interested only in their own continued existence”. Against conceptions of 
autonomy associated with Hardt and Negri’s (2000) notion of human molecules and forms of 
bio-power, Bonefeld (2004, p. 3) argues that “autonomy without organization is a 
contradiction in terms”. Autonomy, “if it takes itself seriously, requires organizational forms 
of negativity” because there are no free autonomous spaces within capitalism. Therefore, self-
organized negation, in the form of social autonomy, expresses the struggle against capital and 
its state, and associated institutions of social integration. 
 However, it is important to be cautions and to avoid the exclusive focus on small 
utopias. The emphasis on local solidarities and autonomous organization run the risk of 
condemning as eminently bureaucratic and authoritarian traditional instruments of popular 
struggle, such as unions and parties, which are judged in terms their organizational forms 
instead of the content of their action. 
 
5.3 DIALOGICAL HORIZONTAL ORGANIZATION 
 
  Sitrin (2005), writing in the Argentinean context in which the term horizontality 
emerged (from the organization of grassroots autonomous movements), defined it as a mode 
of political organizing characterized by non-hierarchical relations, decentralized coordination, 
direct democracy, and the striving for consensus. In the field of OS, Maeckelbergh (2014, p. 
350) provided a softer definition, accepting some hierarchy. For her, horizontality is “a term 
used by movement actors to refer to less hierarchical, networked relationships of decision-
making and the creation of organizing structures that actively attempt to limit power 
inequalities”. In a nuanced definition, including delegation and the existence of a kind of 
leadership, Misoczky and Moraes (2011) defined horizontal organizational practices as having 
the following characteristics: lead by obeying (mandar obedeciendo – a principle that 
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originated in the Mexican Zapatista movement); direct participation; collective deliberation; 
authorized delegation; co-responsibility. 
In another work, Moraes and Misoczky (2010) used an approach based on Freire’s 
theory of antidialogical and dialogical action to analyse the organizational practices of a 
piquetero organization in Argentina. This appropriation can contribute towards the 
development of further insights into horizontality. Freire (2005) often addressed the need for 
the conscious self-organization of the oppressed as a means for achieving their liberation. In 
his theory of oppressive action, he discussed the characteristics of antidialogical action: (1) 
conquest - necessity for conquering the other in order to impose objectives; (2) divide and rule 
- the oppressor minority must divide the majority in order to remain in power and halt, by any 
means (including violence), any action that could awaken the oppressed to the need for unity, 
organization, and struggle; (3) manipulation - the dominant try to conform the masses to their 
objectives; (4) cultural invasion - the cultural context of another group is disrespected by the 
imposition of world views, inhibiting the creativity of the invaded by curbing their 
expression. In contraposition, Freire (2005) developed a theory of dialogical action, which 
also has four characteristics: (1) cooperation - social subjects meet in order to transform the 
world; (2) unity for liberation - the leaders must dedicate themselves to an untiring effort to 
achieve unity among the oppressed and unity of the leaders with the oppressed; (3) 
organization – it is not only directly linked to unity, but is a natural development of that unity, 
it is also the antagonist opposite of manipulation; (4) cultural synthesis - cultural action, like 
historical action, is an instrument for overcoming the dominant alienated and alienating 
culture. 
 
5.4 ORGANIZING UTOPIAN SPACES: THE POWER OF THE STREETS 
  
 Lefebvre (2003) identified three types of space: (1) isotopies – identical spaces that 
can be compared, quantified and mapped, spaces of order and rationality; (2) heterotopies – 
ambiguous spaces, both excluded and interwoven; and (3) utopies – non-places, spaces of 
consciousness, imagined spaces that contain the promise of liberation and transcendence. 
When the movement of May 1968 took the Quartier Latin, in Paris, Lefebvre (1969, p. 118) 
wrote: “[…] the utopian locality came to assume an extraordinary presence”. The power of 
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the streets has the force to shake up societies, or at least to produce or reveal an institutional 
crisis. It is an effective power, even if transitory. However, 
 
When the process of dis-alienation through unfettered speech, street activities 
and spontaneous disorder – when this dis-alienation process ebbed, the order 
of everyday existence reorganized itself in its down-to-earth solidity. This 
disruption of the social order came to be viewed as disruption of everyday 
existence; the restoration of everyday existence supports the restoration of 
social order (LEFEBVRE, 1969, p. 89). 
 
Strategies of constructing spaces of popular power, which include marches and open 
public assemblies in parks and squares, mainly in the city centre but also in peripheral 
neighbourhoods, are examples public interventions that produce transient utopic spaces. At 
the heart of the real, they explore the realm of possibilities. 
However, to transform possibilities into reality it is important to avoid “falling in love 
with the beautiful moment” of the masses in the streets and take into consideration the risks of 
fragmentation, political impotence and/or the expression of traditional and new expressions of 




 Organization, for Lukács (1971, p. 299) “is the mediation between theory and 
practice”, it is praxis. This means, that which is theoretical, an idea, must be made present 
organizationally to become practical in a real struggle. It is the teleological positing that 
reproduces, in the political praxis, the original phenomenon of labour, the exclusive human 
activity that operates under the knowledge of the causal properties of things in the world 
(LUKÁCS, 2012). Things that can be transcended by knowing and acting, by praxis. 
 The distinct contribution of this materialist ontology to the study of SMs is that it 
demands our academic critical practice to relate to the real world and concrete struggles. As 
academics, we can stand shoulder to shoulder with the activists, in an analectical solidarity 
and/or as co-militants, and we can use our privileged position to access the institutional 
publishing apparatus to fight the “battle of ideas” (GRAMSCI, 1971) at one key structure of 
the cultural circuits of capitalism (THRIFT, 2005). 
 To know is not to contemplate; it is not to reflect on the object’s immediacy, it is 
mediation and a moment of transformation. Therefore, a Marxist ontology imposes the 
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question of for whom and to what purpose knowledge is produced. This is not the same as the 
neo-illuminist critique that affirms that all knowledge is historical and social, while remaining 
prisoner of the centrality of the cognizant subject. Instead, it is a statement that the object’s 
primacy is what indicates the theoretical content. However, it is necessary to say that the 
object is never pure particularity. All objects are, at the same time, singular and universal, as 
well as historically and socially determined. Therefore, this ontology interdicts the imposition 
of previously defined models of form/content or “a set of pre-packed answers” when studying 
SMs (COX, 2017, p. 16). 
 This is what we attempt to do in our militant academic praxis. The capacity to identify 
which enemies to fight against, and how they articulate among themselves, can only be 
achieved by comprehending the causal socioeconomic relations of the oppressive situation 
which people are submitted to in their everyday life. Therefore, the knowledge produced in 
these processes of struggles includes the explanation, from the perspective of the people, of 
how and why oppression is organized as it is. This is a movement that goes from their creative 
praxis to theory and back again.  
The fact that OS are still dominated by the reified concept of organization is still an 
obstacle to the study of movements and their organizational practices. However, organization 
is a key concept for the study of SMs and we can provide a relevant contribution from within 
OS, if we keep in mind that, as Rauber (2003) argues, organizations that are built, by thought 
and action, in popular social struggles are mere political and social instruments and, at the 
same time, a component of the utmost importance. As instruments, these organizations can be 
ephemeral or more permanent, but by principle they will always be in movement. 
The materialist ontology we have adopted here provides a means for further 
developments in this direction, because it demands the comprehension of the historical causes 
and the relations that make the existent what it is. This can be applied to any social complex 
and manifestations, ranging from policies to the law; from economic doctrines to different 
kinds of organizations and organizational processes. While considering “how the movement 
grows out of the material social relationships that shape people’s lives” (COX, 2017, p. 5), it 
also provides a means of addressing the specificities of movements in parts of the world 
where the need to organize and struggle is a matter of survival.  
This paper expresses the hope that with further engagements and dialogues we can 
explore the vast possibilities of knowledge production on the political question of the 
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organization of social struggles, “reactivating the movement of thought and practice”, as 
Lefebvre (1969, p. 8) wished, learning with the activists and valuing the changing realities of 
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